The LTD A.K. Group Scam Empire: Technical Analysis of the BCHWorld & SBGlobal Domain Clusters

In our BCHWorld scam review published in April 2024, we warned investors that this entity was operating without regulatory approval. Since then, our ScamReader intelligence unit has uncovered a multi-million euro criminal ecosystem managed by the LTD A.K. Group (also known as the AKH Group).

This investigation connects three distinct high-value fraud incidents across the Netherlands and Australia, proving that platforms like BCHWorld.com(or bchworldex.com, or  bchworldue.com) and SBGlobal.io are mere skins on a single, industrialized money-laundering machine. 

Breaking News(2026): bchworld.com is currently listed for sale on GoDaddy, targeting unsuspecting buyers.

The Syndicate: Inside the LTD A.K. Group & Akaki Kevkhishvili’s “Scam-as-a-Service”

The LTD A.K. Group is a transnational organized crime syndicate headquartered in Tbilisi, Georgia. Following the 2025 criminal probe by the Georgian Prosecutor’s Office and international media (OCCRP/The Guardian), Akaki Kevkhishvili was identified as the “de facto boss” of this operation.Despite asset freezes on his luxury vehicles and real estate, Kevkhishvili’s infrastructure continues to pivot through new domains.

Far from being a small group of hackers, they operate a “Scam-as-a-Service” model, utilizing:

• Boiler Rooms: High-pressure call centers in Georgia, Ukraine, and Albania.

• Financial Gateways: Shell companies (AK Ltd) registered in Cyprus and Spain to access the European banking system.

• Crypto-Laundering Hubs: Strategic partnerships with Electronic Money Institutions (EMIs) in Lithuania.

• Enforcement Compounds: High-security facilities in Myanmar (Myawaddy) and Cambodia where technical support and social media “lures” are managed.

Technical Incident Report 1: “Thomas” (The Netherlands)

Investigative Disclaimer

To protect the ongoing work of international law enforcement and to ensure the privacy of the victims involved, names and official police case numbers in this report have been anonymized or replaced with fictitious identifiers. The financial transactions and technical signatures (Virtual IBANs and merchant IDs) remain forensic facts derived from real-world bank statements.

Platform: BCHWorld.com Total Loss: €15,000.00 Case Reference: REDACTED. 

“Thomas,” a Dutch professional, was targeted through a sophisticated “pig-butchering” investment lure. His case provides the technical blueprint for the group’s “Placement” and “Layering” phases.

Placement & Layering (Lithuania)

Thomas was instructed to transfer funds to Unioncash EU UAB (IBAN: REDACTED). Our analysis of his bank records shows a series of rapid-fire transfers designed to test the bank’s fraud triggers:

• 11 July 2024: €4,000.00

• 12 July 2024: €3,000.00

• 14 July 2024: €3,000.00

Technical Signature: Every transfer carried the reference code U245927164. This is an internal system ID (Virtual IBAN) that credits the AKH Group’s master wallet within the EMI.

The Integration Trap (Italy)

On 16 July 2024, Thomas was coerced into a secondary transfer of €5,000.00 to UniCredit SPA in Italy. The scammers used a psychological trick by listing the recipient as “Thomas” (his own name), convincing him he was funding a “private liquidity account.” In reality, this was a mule account used to integrate the stolen funds into the legitimate economy.

Technical Incident Report 2: “Lucas” (Australia)

Platform: BCHWorld.io / BCHWorld.com Total Loss: ~€15,000.00 (AUD Equivalent)

“Lucas,” an Australian investor, was targeted using the exact same infrastructure as Thomas. His case proves the global reach of the U245927164 identifier.

The Standardized Playbook

Lucas was assigned an “Account Manager” who used the same scripts reported by victims in Europe. He was directed to the same Lithuanian gateway, Unioncash EU UAB. The technical alignment between a victim in the Netherlands and a victim in Australia confirms that the LTD A.K.Group uses a centralized “clearing house” for all their global domain clusters.

By using the same Lithuanian EMI for both victims, the syndicate reduces its operational overhead and speeds up the conversion of fiat currency into untraceable Tether (USDT).

Technical Incident Report 3: “Ethan” (Australia)

Platform: SBGlobal.io Total Loss: $40,000.00+ AUD

“Ethan’s” case is a critical link in our investigation because it ties the BCHWorld cluster to a second, high-value domain: SBGlobal.io.

The Domain Cluster Connection

While the branding was different, the technical DNA was identical:

1. Shared UI/UX: The trading dashboard on SBGlobal.io uses the same “White Label” software as BCHWorld and the rest, featuring identical fake profit-generation algorithms.

2. The “Forced Liquidation” Script: Because Ethan invested a larger sum ($40,000 AUD), the scammers moved faster. They fabricated a market crash on his dashboard and demanded an immediate “margin call” payment to “save” his investment, a hallmark of the AKH Group’s high-value extraction team.

3. Coordinated IPs: Forensic analysis shows that SBGlobal and BCHWorld frequently share backend IP addresses and DNS configurations, suggesting they are managed by the same IT cell in Georgia.

Technical Comparison: Linking BCHWorld to SBGlobal via “Technical DNA”

The most damning evidence in this investigation is the shared technical footprint across seemingly unrelated sites. Whether a victim is targeted by BCHWorld or SBGlobal, the backend financial and digital architecture remains constant.

Identifying the LTD A.K. Group Signature

For investigators and victims, identifying the LTD A.K. Group requires looking for these three technical markers:

1. The EMI Gateway: Use of Lithuanian or Estonian EMIs (like Unioncash) with unique alphanumeric user IDs in the reference field.

2. The “Self-Transfer” Deception: Demanding transfers to accounts in Italy or Spain where the recipient’s name is the victim’s own name.

3. The Tbilisi Connection: VOIP (Voice over IP) calls that, when traced, originate from IP ranges assigned to business districts in Tbilisi, Georgia.

Forensic Recommendations: How to Recover

If you lost money fraudulently to BCHWorld, SBGlobal, or any site linked to the AK Ltd, time is your enemy. You must act swiftly for the best chance of recovery.

1. Properly Escalate Your Case

You should formally file a complaint with your local police to officially document the case.

Next, notify your local financial services regulator, e.g., the Financial Conduct Authority (for UK residents), the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Australia), or the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (for residents of Cyprus).

Finally, visit our Reporting Page and submit your case to proceed with the next steps. You may also send an email to scamread@scamreader.info.

2. The SEPA Fraud Recall

Instruct your bank to initiate a SEPA Fraud Recall (SCT Recall). Mention that the recipient account is linked to an international syndicate currently reported to your local police and financial services regulator(include a case number if available). This forces the receiving bank to conduct an AML audit.

3. Cross-Border Coordination

You should be ready to coordinate with European authorities, as funds often pass through the EU banking system before scammers convert them into cryptocurrency. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) or Eurojust may be a good place to begin.

Conclusion

The AKH Group along with its domains, including bchworld.com, bchworldex.com, bchworldue.com, and sbglobal.io, rely on the anonymity of the internet and the fragmentation of international law. By linking the cases of Thomas, Lucas, and Ethan, we uncover their technical infrastructure. The domains bchworld.com, bchworldue.com, bchworldex.com,  and sbglobal.io are just masks; the real target for law enforcement is the U245927164 ledger and the masterminds in Tbilisi.

FAQ

1. How do I report Unioncash EU UAB fraud?

Answer: You’ll need to follow an escalation process with several steps in Lithuania: first, submit a formal written complaint to Unioncash’s compliance department, including all transaction details and the specific reference code (e.g., U245927164).

If they fail to provide a satisfactory response within 15 business days, you should escalate the matter to the Bank of Lithuania (the national regulator) via their electronic dispute system or by emailing tl.bl@ofni.

At the same time, because the funds link to an organized crime syndicate (LTD A.K. Group), you must report the money laundering aspect to the Financial Crime Investigation Service (FNTT) at dokumentas@fntt.lt, citing your local police case number to trigger a cross-border investigation.

2. Why did the scammers ask me to transfer money to my own name in Spain?

Answer: This is the “Self-Transfer Deception.” Scammers use your name to bypass bank fraud filters and make you feel safe. In reality, the IBAN belongs to a mule account the LTD A.K. Group syndicate controls.

3. Can the local authorities really help me if I am an individual victim?

Answer: Yes. While local police may not arrest the masterminds in Georgia directly, they provide the official police report necessary for bank fund recalls and upload your data to Europol’s SIENA system, linking your case to a global investigation.

4. Is a SEPA Fraud Recall guaranteed to get my money back?

Answer: A SEPA Recall is a request, not a reversal. The success depends on two factors: speed and available funds. If you act within the first few days, your bank can request the recipient bank to freeze the account.

Are you a victim of the AKH Group?

Contact our team at ScamReader.info to contribute your data to our global investigation and join our victim advocacy cluster.